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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
UTAH SAND AND GRAVEL PRODUCTS 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
11341 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
Cond6mnation giving rise to damages for taking 
of .92 acres and claimed severance damage to por-
tion of remaining property by closing of access. 
Disposition in Lower Court 
The case was tried to a jury. A fair award was 
given for the property taken. From that portion of 
the verdict and judgment finding no damages re-
sulting from the closing of access, defendant ap-
peals. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Defendant seeks a new trial on the question of 
2 
damages resulting from the closing by the State of 
existing access to U.S. 89. 
Statement of Facts 
Defendant owned property on both sides of 
U.S. 89 running south about 921 feet from the Weber 
River. (Plaintiff's Exhibit A) The State of Utah in im-
proving U.S. 89 from Harrison Blvd. in Ogden to 
Farmington Junction sought in this proceeding to 
widen the highway and in so doing took a narrow 
strip of defendant's property on each side of said 
highway consisting of a total of .92 acres. The State 
also sought in this proceeding to establish a limited 
access line on both sides of U.S. 89. 
Summons was served upon the defendant on 
March 1, 1965, and after commencement of the ac-
tion, defendant sought approval of the State Road 
Commission to establish direct access from its prop-
erty onto U.S. 89 but was refused (Def. Exhibits l 
and 2) notwithstanding the fact that there had been 
a direct access from defendant's property to U.S. 89 
for many years preceding this closing by the State 
(T. 50-51). The "limited access" line proposed by the 
State thus became a 11 non-access" line so far as it 
affected this defendant (T. 31). 
Defendant in its answer raised the issue that the 
taking of its access was not reasonable nor neces-
sary and asked that it be restored or in the alterna-
tive that damages resulting from the taking of access 
be awarded m. 47). 
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The question of the reasonableness or the 
necessity of the taking of the access was closed and 
taken from the jury by the court who described it 
to the jury early in the trial as virtually an absolute 
right (T. 31) without determination as to the neces-
sity of the taking of the access (T. 46). 
It was the claim of the defendant that its prop-
erty abutting U.S. 89, with access, became commer-
cial in use and valuation as of the dates when I-80 
exiting from Weber Canyon became known, long 
before the taking by the State of the property and 
access subject of this litigation. Mr. Knowlton testi-
fied that upon lea.ming I-,go would be coming down 
Weber Canyon they were convinced that the chief 
value of the subject property would be commercial 
(T. 36). Again by offer of proof he stated the minute 
it was known that J-80 would be coming down 
Weber Canyon it was very evident that the subject 
property thereafter had as its highest and best use 
commercial development (T. 60-61, 188). Mr. Solo-
mon testified by offer of proof that the location of 
the subject property as the first privately owned 
land available for commercial development south 
of the off-ramps from I-80 rendered it commercial (T. 
95), as of the date the location of the off-ramps from 
I~80 became known (T. 101-102). Mr. Barlow by offer 
of proof testified that the location of the off-ramps 
from I-80 made the difference in the subject property 
being valued commercial or for gravel reserves (T. 
105-106). Mr. Knowlton testified by offer of proof 
that the public meeting in Ogden wherein the State 
Road Commission made known the location of the 
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off-ramps from I-80 was held on May 29, 1959 (T. 187). 
The I-80 project was attended with non-access lines. 
The later improvement of U.S. 89 contemplated 
limited access (Plaintiff's Exhibit A). 
Defendant claimed that the commercial value 
of Hs property was destroyed by the closing by the 
State of defendant's access (T. 108). If the property 
was not commercial there was no damage by clos-
ing direct access to U.S. 89 (T. 114). Mr. Joseph Ray 
testified that he is president of the town board of 
South Weber wherein the subject property lies (T. 
63); that the said property at one time was zoned 
commercial and was subsequently zoned G-1-
Gravel, which zoning applied at the time of the tak-
ing and since (T. 64). He further testified that the 
probability was that an application to rezone the 
property commercial would be favorably consid-
ered 0nd acted upon by the town board (T. 65). 
The court refused to admit evidence of highest 
and best use or value based in any way on the ef-
fect of construction or proposed construction of I-80 
on defendant's land or surrounding values (T. 86, 
109, 112). The cmirt further, without evidence to 
justify its position, lectured the jury why the effect 
of construction of I-80 must be disregarded (T. 86-
87). Again the crn lft misled the jury regarding the 
law on this point in citing an example of Pine View 
Dam (T. 115). 
Forced by the court to assume that there was 
no such thing as I-80, the defendant's experts were 
compelled to testify that the remaining property 
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would be valued as gravel land (T. 112, 115). One 
witness wa_s prevented by the court from answering 
as to the effect upon his opinion of the existence 
of I-80 (T. 115). 
Thus if the property was commercial, defendant 
cla.imed to be damaged as a result of the closing of 
access according to expert Barlow $22,373.00 (T. 109), 
and according to expert Solomon $21,885.00 (T. 91-
g2). The jury was ne-;er permitted to hear this testi-
mony. The record discloses 108 pages of evidence 
before the jury and 72 pages of evidence by way of 
off er of proof. Most of the offer of proof was evi-
dence supporting defendant's theory that the effect 
of the construction of I-80 on the potential use and 
actual value of defendant's property was a proper 
consideration. 
Mr. Kay, called by the defendant as an adverse 
witness, testified by way of offer of proof that he is 
Chief Engineer for the Department of Highways for 
Utah (T. 136). In 1956 Congress authorized the 40,-
000 miles of Interstate National Defense Highway 
System (T. 138). Since 1-80 as originally contem-
plated, turned south at Echo Junction, the State 
Road Commission requested that it also run west 
from Echo I unction through Weber Canyon and into 
Ogden (T. 141). This request was approved in Oc-
tober, 1957, and this new stretch of the Interstate 
National Defense Highway system was denom-
inated NI-80 (T. 142). On May 29, 1959, the State 
Road Commission held a public meeting in Ogden 
a.nd the proposed route of NI-80, its relationship and 
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proximity to and north of the Weber River in the 
vicinity of U.S. 89 and the location of the "on-off" 
ramps where NI-80 crossed U.S. 89 were known and 
discussed. (T. 144, 145) Approximately 3 weeks after 
the said meeting the publicly discussed location of 
the routes and "on-off" ramps became official and 
confirmed (T. 144, 166) and it was known that in 
order to construct that project it would not be neces-
sary to take any property south of the Weber River 
(T. 167). 
U.S. Highway 89 had long been part of the Utah 
Primary Highway System (T. 146) and as such was 
separate and distinct from the new system approved 
in 1956 (T. 147). Each state has a primary road sys-
tem and these are intended to form a network. 
I-80 and improvement of U.S. 89 were two sepa-
rate projects (T. 152, 153). 
In November of 1959, a preliminary study re-
port of the traffic condition in Davis County was 
printed within the State Road Commission wherein 
the impact of population growth, changes of traffic 
patterns and the 8ffect oi traffic to be generated by 
NI-80 was contemplated (T. 163). The author recom-
mended that U.S. 89 from Uintah Junction to Farm-
ington Junction should be improved to move more 
traffic faster (T. 175). At the time of this study it was 
not known what specific improvements would be 
made on U.S. 89 nor "''here nor to what extent, if at 
all, these improvements wou]d touch or affect the 
ground of the defendant (T. 170-171). Not until 1962 
did the Road Commission begin to move forward in 
planning improvements to U.S. 89 (T. 154). 
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The court, in a leading and suggestive manner, 
asked Mr. Kay if the project known as NI-80 and the 
project known as F-030-1 (2) (the U.S. 89 project from 
Uintah Junction to Cherry Lane) were "interwoven" 
and the witness agreed that they were (T. 168). 
The defendant's property taken and damaged 
by the state in this case was part of the latter proj-
ect. This project was the first stretch of U.S. 89 lying 
south of NI-80 and south of the Weber River. 
Although it had been gradually upgraded there 
had been no major improvement of U.S. 89 in the 
vicinity of the Weber River since before 1952 (T. 
148). Traffic has increased annually since 1952 and 
between 1957 and 1965 had increased annually from 
six thousand units per day in 1957 (T. 203) to eleven 
thousand units per day in 1965 (T. 208) and was by 
1965 a problem (T. 204). Improvement of U.S. 89 
regardless of the construction of NI-80 was indicated 
(T. 156) and the study report of November of 1959 
so stated (T. 175). Had I-80 not been in the picture 
the same design criteria would have been used in 
improving U.S. 89 (T. 196). 
The court refused to permit the defendant's ap-
praiser witnesses to consider the effect of the 1959 
anticipated construction of NI-80 on the value or 
use of the defendant property as of March 1, 1965, 
the date of the taking (T. 86, 112). Indeed, the court 
in the presence of the jury, told the appraiser wit-
nesses in arriving at their opinions of value of de-
fendant's land at the time of the taking (March I, 
l 965) that they must ignore NI-80 and assume that 
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it was not there (T. 112). Since NI-80 had been one 
of the accepted facts of life bearing on property 
values since before June of 1959, this created an 
impossible task for defendant's appraisers. 
In its instructions, the court advised the jury it 
should consider values as of the date the summons 
was issued, to wit: March 1, 1965 (R. 89, Instruction 
No. 2). 
However, elsewhere in its instructions, the 
court confused the jury as to which project the "on-
off" ramps attached to and again instructed the jury 
that they must disregard the effect of I-80 in de-
termining market value (R. 92, Instruction No. 5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
STATE COULD NOT TAKE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO U.S. 89 WITHOUT A DETERMINATION OF 
THE NECESSITY THEREFOR. 
The State refused to grant access to U.S. 89 from 
defendant's remaining ground. The State further 
refused to permit a break in the limited access line 
merely to permit traffic on U.S. 89 traveling south to 
exit from the highway onto defendant's property. 
Under these facts defendant was entitled to a de-
termination by the court based on evidence whether 
the state's action in imposing a non-access on the 
defendant's remaining land was necessary. As ap-
pears from pages 31 and 46 of the trial transcript the 
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court did not properly view its statutory power to 
review the Commission's action. 
78-34-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
reads: 
"Conditions precedent to taking.-Before prop-
erty can be taken it must appear: 
(2) That the taking is necessary to such use;" 
78-34-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amend-
ed, reads: 
"Powers of Court or Judge-The court or judge 
thereof shall have power: 
( 1) To determine the conditions specified in 
section 78-34-4 ;" 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES OR THE JURY TO CON-
SIDER THE EFFECT OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
I-80 AND ITS OFF-RAMPS ON THE USE AND VALUE 
OF DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY. 
Essentially the question presented to the court 
is "should the defendant, condemnee, be permitted 
to claim enhancement of value of his property re-
sulting from the prior planning and construction by 
the State of project I-80 near the property of the con-
demnee subsequently taken by the state in its con-
struction of improvements on U.S. 89." 
I-80 was authorized by Congress in 1956 and 
authorized down Weber Canyon in 1957. A public 
meeting in May of 1959 made known the planned 
location of on-off ramps on I-80 where it inter-
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changed with U.S. 89. In June of 1959 the location 
and identity of the on-off ramps of I-80 at its inter-
change with U.S. 89 became official and confirmed. 
As of that time the property of the defendant, sub-
ject of this litigation, was the first privately owned 
property south of the I-80 project on U.S. 89 and its 
potential use thereby changed from gravel reserve 
to commercial. The date of the taking of the prop-
erty in question for the improvement of U.S. 89 was 
March 1, 1965. 
78-34-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amend-
ed, provides: 
''For the purpose of assessing compensation and 
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to have 
accrued at the date of the service of summons, and 
its actual value at that date shall be the measure 
of compensation for all property to be actually taken, 
and the basis of damag·es to property not actually 
taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases where such 
damages are allowed, as provided in the next preced-
ing section. No improvements put upon the property 
subsequent to the date of service of summons shall be 
included in the assessment of compensation or dam-
ages." 
In 4 Nichols, on Eminent Domain, Third Edition, 
pages 201-211, Section 12.3151 on the subject of "Ef-
fect of Proposed Taking," we find the following: 
''(a) Where location of proposed project is 
definite. The rule has heen stated to be that the 
owner of land taken bv eminent domain is not en-
titled to receive any ii:-icrease in the value of such 
land where the fact is that the land was known to 
be within the area designated for condemnation and 
was certain to be taken.' 
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( b) Where the location of the proposed proj-
ect is indefinite. "* * * it is usually held that the 
owner is entitled to the benefit of the appreciation 
in value from the general expectation that the im-
provement for which it was taken would soon be con-
structed." 
( c) Where there is a supplemental taking. "If 
a definite area has already been condemned, the mar-
ket value of the neighboring property is naturally af-
fected thereby. If an enhancement in value results 
such property is entitled to the benefit thereof. It 
follows that if the original project is subsequently en-
larged so as to embrace additional property, such ad-
ditional property as is involved in the supplemental 
taking is entitled to the benefit of any enhancement 
in value which resulted from the original taking. If, 
however, the public project from the beginning in-
cluded the taking of certain tracts, but only one of 
them is taken in the first instance, the owner of the 
other tracts should not be allowed an increased value 
for his lands which are ultimately taken." 
In Orgel, on Valuation, under Eminent Domain, 
Volume 1, 2d Edition, we find the following: 
"Sec. 98 * ~, * In the present chapter, we must 
consider two types of situations: First, those in which 
uncertainty as to the precise location of the improve-
ment causes an enhancement in the value of prop-
erty subsequently condemned and second, those in 
which the land taken was from the outset definitely 
designated for inclusion in the project. * * * 
"We may surmise that the bulk of condemna-
tion cases do not come within either of the two 
groups discussed in the preceding paragraphs, but 
rather that most cases fall athwart both groups. * * * 
"Sec. 99, p. 427: "* * * Insofar as the factual 
basis of the decisions may be determined from the 
opinions, the cases fall into three general classifica-
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tions: First, those in which the land taken was 
marked for use in the project from the beginning; 
second, cases in which the land taken was not within 
the original scope of the project, but was needed for 
expansion or for purposes which might be regarded as 
incidental to the project; third, cases in which the 
general location of the pro3ect is fixed, but the exact 
location or the extent thereof is uncertain. In gen-
eral, in those cases falling in the first group, no en-
hancement in value is allowed, and in cases involving 
the second and third factual classifications enhance-
ment in value due to proximity to an established or 
definitely planned improvement is allowed." 
Sec. 104, p. 443, Benefits Anticipated from One 
Continuous Scheme of Development v. Benefits Con· 
ferred by S~parate Projects. "While the decisions of 
the courts are not in accord on the question whether 
an enhancement in value caused by the very im· 
provement for which the land is taken should be 
considered, rhey would probably all agree that an in· 
crease in value of land resulting from a prior and sep· 
arate improvement should be allowed. Thus, if there 
is an anticipated rise in value hecause of a projected 
street on which the property will front, and if this 
land is subsequently taken for park purposes, its en· 
hanced value by reason of the anticipated benefits to 
result from the projected street improvement will be 
allowed." (Emphasis added) 
" * ':' * Other courts that have sustained awards 
of enhanced values have sometimes fortified their 
holdings by a findi11g· that the project which en-
gendered the inciemeni is not the s~une as that for 
which the land is takPn. 
"The courts haw~ not clearlv defined the criteria 
by which we may determine ~hether the improve· 
ment that causes the enhancement in value is part 
of the project for whirh the land is condemned. * ':' * 
" ':' * * In McChristy v. Hall County (Texas. 
1940), 140 S.W. (?d) fi76. where land had previously 
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been acquired for a highway and construction had 
been started, in a proceeding to condemn land for a 
borrow pit the value of the land as enhanced by the 
proposed highway was allowed, the court saying: 
"The fact that previous improvements have 
been made by the condemner or others is a fac-
tor which it is proper to consider in arriving at 
its [the land's] value. * * * 
"The owner may be able to sell his land to 
others at the value to which it is enhanced by 
the location of the road and we conceive no 
reason why he should be penalized merely be-
cause it is desired by the public. * * * " 
In Vol. 27, American Jurisprudence (2d), Emi-
nent Domain, the following is stated: 
Sec. 281, p. 74, "The test of market value is not 
the property's value for a special purpose, but its 
fair market value in view of all purposes to which 
it is natural1y adapted. But this is not to say that 
a special purpose to which the land may be adapted 
is necessarily of no significance. As a general thing, 
the adaptability of the land sought to be taken in 
eminent domain for a special purpose or use may be 
considered as an element of value, unless it is an 
illegal use or unless the land owner, after receiving 
knowledge that the land is to be condemned, puts 
it to a special use merely for the purpose of increas-
ing the compensation or damages." 
Sec. 284, p. 82: " * * * But where the taking 
of the land was not conceived as a part of the original 
project but as an independent enterprise subsequent-
ly undertaken in connection with the original proj-
ect, * * * the owner of land taken for the purpose 
of extending or enlarging the original project is en-
titled to the enhancement in the value of the land 
due to the improvement." 
Sec. 356, p. 203: "Where a condemnor, by a 
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prior eminent domain proceeding, has acquired som~ 
right in an owner's property and by a second pro-
ceeding. seeks to ~cquire a further right for the pub-
lic use, the dnmages in such second appropriation 
would apparently he the value of the property in its 
then situation, irrespective of the fact that under the 
prior proceeding a part of the property has been 
taken. The situation vrnuld seem to be no different 
than as if the owner of the property had sold the 
right which was taken in the first eminent domain 
proceeding, leavin~ him with some interest, or a 
limited interest, in the property. The questinn as to 
the amount of damages would, therefore, be the value 
of this interest. regardless of the fact that it was, at 
one time, pl'lrt of a larger tract. (See State Highway 
Com. v. Stumbo (Ore.) 31)2 P. (2), 478. 
A major annotation on the subject "Incremenl 
to Value, from project for which land is condemned 
as a factor in fixing compensation" is found in 147 
A.LR., pages 66-103. Attention of the court is called 
to the following pertinent statements made in thal 
annotation: 
P. 84, "Some of the cases either intimate or rec-
ognize the rule that the owner is entitled to the in· 
crement in value accruing to the land before any 
definite det0rmination of the location of the improve· 
ment and at a time when though there was an expec-
tation or even a reasonable certaintv that the 
improvement would he constructcrl in ·the general 
neighborhood of the hnd in question, there was no 
certainty of any kind that the land in question would 
be included in or taken for the project; and that, a 
fortiori, this is true where there was a reasonable 
expectation that the land in question would not he in-
cluded in but wnnld ::idjoin the improvement." 
( p. 81) lists the jurisdictions at the time of the 
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annotation which stood for the view that the owner 
is entitled to any increment due to the improvement 
irrespective of whether it was known that the land 
would be included in the project. Utah is not included 
in the jurisdictions listed but it will be seen here-
under that Utah has since adopted this view.) 
p. 88, V. Enlargement or Extension of Previously 
Established Project. "Where a previously established 
project is to be extended or enlarged by condemna-
tion of adjacent land, the question whether the own-
er of the adjacent lands may recover as a part of his 
compensation the enhancement in the value of the 
land since the establishment of the original project 
is frequently made to depend upon the question 
whether at the time of the construction of the orig-
inal project (a) it was contemplated that the land in 
question would sooner or later be taken for the pur-
poses of the project, 01· whether (b) the taking of it 
was conceived, not as a part of the original project, 
but as an independent enterprise subsequently under-
taken in connection with the original project. 
"In the former event, (a) supra, * * * enhance-
ment after a practical certainty that the project will 
include the land in question is not a part of the mar-
ket value of the land for which the owner is entitled 
to compensation * * *. 
"But in the latter event, (b) supra, * * * en-
hancement prior to the determination of the location 
of improvement and inclusion therein of the land in 
question is a part of the market value of the land for 
which the owner is entitled to compensation - the 
owner of the land taken for the purpose of extending 
or enlarging the original project is entitled to the en-
hancement in the value of the land due to the im-
provement." 
As pointed out in 147 A.LR., p. 98, statutes of 
some of the states contain a provision substantially 
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to the effect that the owner shall be entitled to re-
ceive compensation for his land "irrespective of any 
benefits" or "irrespective of increased value from 
any improvements proposed by the condemnor." 
The Utah Supreme Court by decision appears to 
have a_ccepted thls philosophy. 
See Weber Basin Water Conservancy District 
v. Ward, et al., 10 Utah (2d) 29, 347 P. (2d) 862. In this 
case, the trial court, Parley E. Norseth, Judge, had 
permitted the jury to consider enhancement to the 
property being taken or damaged resulting from 
the improvements proposed by the condemnor. In 
supporting the trial court, the Utah Supreme Court, 
without dissent adopts that rule which permits the 
owner of property being condemned to realize, as 
part of his damages, the enhanced value of his prop-
erty resulting from the proiect subject of the con-
demnation. The court c:~tes the Rhode Island case of 
Stafford v. Providence, 14 Am. Rep. 710. In that case 
the trial court refused to instruct the jury that it had 
"no right to consider or make use of the fact" that 
the land had been increased in value "by the pro· 
posal or construction of the improvement.'' The 
judgment was affirmed on appeal where the Rhode 
Island Court held that the measure of compensation 
was the market value of the land at the time it was 
taken of whatever elements composed. 
In settling the question for the State of Utah 
and the trial courts herein, the Supreme Court stated 
as follows: 
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"We are in nccord with what appears to be the 
better view, adopted hy the trial court, that the con-
demnee is entitled to the fair market value of his 
property at the time of the service of summons in 
the condemnation proceedings as provided by statute; 
and that all factors bearing upon such value that any 
prudent purchaser would take into account at that 
time should be given consideration, including any 
potential development in the area reasonably to be 
expected." (Emphasis added.) 
The above language of the Utah Supreme Court 
has been subsequently referred to and quoted with 
approval by the Utah Court in Southern Pacific Com-
pany v. Arthur. et al .• ( 1960) 10 Utah (2d) 306, 352 P. 
(2d) 693, and State of Utah by and through its Road 
Commission v. Wooley. (1964), 15 Utah (2d) 248, 390 
P. (2) 860. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTION NUM-
BER 5, GIVEN TO THE JURY, THAT THE JURY 
COULD GIVE NO EFFECT TO AND COULD NOT CON-
SIDER THE EFFECT OF T-80 IN ITS DELIBERATIONS. 
See argument under point II. Furthermore, In-
3truction No. 5, is vague and ambiguous. All of the 
evidence regarding the propriety of considering en-
hanced value resulting to defendant's property on 
U.S. 89 as a result of project I-80 as well as evidence 
of damage attributable thereto came in by way of 
off er of proof and was not before the jury. The in-
struction merely twisted the knife that had previous-
} Y been thrust into defendant's theory of the case by 
way of rulings on the evidence. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR A MISTRIAL. 
At page 88 and again at page 230 of the trial 
transcript are recorded defendant's motions for mis-
trial on the grounds of errors including the error of 
the court set forth in Point II herein. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE ANY 
OF DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
Defendant's requested instructions number three 
and four properly sta_ted the law of the State of Utah 
applicable in this case: 
Instruction No. 3 
"You are instructed that in arriving at the value 
of the property being acquired by the State of Utah 
in this case, you shall determine such value by the 
fair market value of such property at the date of 
summons issued herein, to wit: March 1, 1965. Thr 
term "market value" of the property means the price 
it will bring when offered for sale by one who desires 
but is not obligated to sell and is bought by one who 
desires but is not obli?.·ate<l to purchase the property. 
"In determining fair market value, you must 
recognize the highest and best use to which the prop-
erty is susceptible at the time of the taking and you 
shall award damages based upon the fair market 
value of the property for that highest and best use 
to which it was susceptible." (R. 81) 
Instruction No. 4 
"In determining the highest and best use of the 
19 
property at the time of the taking, you are not re-
stricted to that nse to which the property may have 
been put in the past, but you may consider all of the 
evidence presented in this matter on this subject and 
you may find the highest and best use of the prop-
erty taken to be that use to which the property could 
most profitably he put in order to realize its greatest 
productivity. Thus, although the defendant may have 
been satisfied to leave the property in an undeveloped 
state or to have userl it in conjunction with its gravel 
operations up to the time of the taking of the same, 
nevertheless, if the property at the time of the taking 
was susceptible for use for commercial or other pur-
poses which would be the highest and best use of the 
property then you shall award damages based on the 
fair market value of the property for that highest and 
best use. 
''Likewise, in determining the highest and best 
use to which the property could be put you are not 
limited to that zoning restriction which may have 
been in effect at the time of the taking. Rather, where 
there is a probability that zoning restrictions will be 
altered in the near future you should consider other 
uses to which the property could be devoted in the 
event of such a change." <R. 82) 
Nowhere in the court's instructions was the jury 
instructed that "Highest and Best Use" was a guid-
ing concept. Forced by the court to disregard the 
effect of I-80, testimony was nonetheless presented 
by Mr. Knowlton that in his opinion the property 
had commercial use at the time of the taking by 
virtue of the mere increase in traffic over the years 
un U.S. 89 (T. 212). He was discredited on cross-
Pxamination by the fact that he had not applied for 
commercial zoning (T. 215). Evidence had been re-
·-::eived that the probability was that an application 
to rezone the property commercial would be ap-
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proved by the town of South Weber at the time o! 
the taking as well as at the time of the trial. (T. 63-65) 
The refusal of the court to give the above quoted in 
structions prevented the jury from being properly 
informed on the law to the prejudice of the de-
fendant. See State of Utah by and through its Road 
Commission v. Jacobs, 16 Utah(2) 167, 397 P(2) 463, 
where the court said: 
" * * * The owner of property under condemna-
tion is entitled to a value based upon the highest and 
best use to which it could be put at the time of the 
taking, without limitation as to the use then actual-
ly made of it. However, the projected use, affecting 
value. must be not only possible, but reasonably 
probable. * '" *" 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant did not receive a fair trial. Proper 
and material evidence in support of its theory o! 
the case vras withheld from the jury. The jury was 
both told and instructed to ignore and disregard 
essential relevant and material facts. The jury was 
not properly instructed as to the law applicable to 
the evidence before it. 
All witnesses agreed that the .92 acres actually 
taken was gravel reserve. The state's witnesses val-
ued it: Smith-$600 per ar=re; Caine, $1,000 per a.ere 
The defendant's witnesses vah1ed it: Knowlton, $2, 
000 per acre; Solomon, 3) 1,4'.?.9 per acre; Barlow, $3r 
000 per acre. The jury fo1 md $2,000 per acre. That 
portion of tl1e verd]ct and juogment should be af-
firmed. 
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The defendant should be granted a new trial 
to determine the just compensation which should 
be awarded as a result of the taking of defendant's 
access to U.S. 89. The court should be required to 
receive evidence before determining whether the 
taking of that access was "necessary." The jury 
should be permitted to hear and consider the effect 
of the projection and construction of I-80 with its at-
tendant interchange and on-off ramps where it af-
fected defendant's land values from prior to June 
of 1959, nearly eight years before the taking 
involved herein. The jury should be instructed to 
assess damages based upon the "highest and best 
use" to which the land could be put at the time of 
the taking. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ramon M. Child 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
